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Consider a common social interaction: Two people must each attend to and 
remember the other person’s behaviour while also keeping track of their own responses. 
Knowledge of what one said to whom is important for subsequent interactions so that 
information is not repeated to the same person. Remembering what one said to others is 
also important in the workplace where supervisors need to remember to whom they have 
told specific information so that they can later assess assignment progress from the 
relevant employee. The processes involved in remembering the destination of information 
will be referred to as “destination memory” in this dissertation. Although there has been 
extensive research regarding the processes involved in remembering the source of 
information, or “source memory,” there has been little to no research on destination 
memory. In a series of four experiments, this dissertation delineates the core features of 
destination memory. 
In Experiment 1, a paradigm was developed to assess destination memory in the 
laboratory. This experiment also corroborated complaints of destination memory failures: 
Adults have very poor destination memory when compared to memory for the 
information they tell or the person to whom they tell the information. Destination 
memory fundamentally differs from source memory in terms of how information is 
transferred—“input” in the case of source memory and “output” in the case of destination 
memory. Attention is directed at the processes involved in transmitting information in the 
case of destination memory which leaves fewer attention resources for associating the 
information with the person one is telling it to. Therefore, it would be anticipated that 
destination memory would be worse than source memory. 
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Experiment 2 directly contrasted destination memory and source memory and 
confirmed that destination memory accuracy was indeed substantially lower than source 
memory accuracy. Because in the case of a destination event information is self-
produced, attention is focused on oneself. Experiment 3 assessed whether self-focus 
reduces the association between the outputted information and the person that one is 
telling it to. When self-focus increased, so too did destination memory errors because 
fewer attentional resources were available to integrate the person-information pairing. 
This led to the prediction that, in the reverse situation where attentional resources are 
directed to the person-information pairing at encoding, then destination memory should 
improve. Experiment 4 confirmed this prediction: Destination memory was enhanced 
when people’s attention was shifted from themselves to the person-information pairing. 
This thesis has undertaken to examine a surprisingly neglected component of 
normal remembering—remembering who one told something to.  To study this 
“destination memory,” a new paradigm is introduced.  Across four experiments, 
destination memory is seen to be quite fallible, more so than source memory.  An account 
is offered in terms of destination memory being undermined by the self-focus that it 
generates. This view is reinforced by two experiments that show that increasing self-
focus reduces destination memory whereas increasing environment-focus improves 
destination memory. Like source memory, destination memory is a key component of 





Like most young children, I was regularly posed the question of what I wanted to 
be when I grew up. Without hesitation, I would blurt out, "scientist," whereas my friends 
aspired to become firemen, astronauts, or the occasional construction truck driver. My 
childhood in the Caribbean nurtured my scientific curiosity. I was free to explore small 
ponds in rainforests, which were filled with frogs and fish in all stages of their life-cycles, 
and I catalogued the motley-coloured birds that visited our home. I witnessed the effects 
of erosion on nearby mountains and designed an experiment to demonstrate that 
deforestation was to blame. I carefully formed two hills out of soil from our yard and 
embedded one with twigs and leaves and left the other bare. While I poured a cup of 
water on each hill to reveal the consequences of deforested land, the fate of my seven-
year-old self was sealed: I was destined to explore and investigate interesting questions 
using the scientific method.  
Twenty years later, I am still conducting experiments, albeit mostly in a 
laboratory. This journey would not have been possible if not for the infinite support of 
my loving parents. I fondly remember the many trips to science fairs, zoos, and museums, 
which undoubtedly influenced my educational aspirations. I am also grateful that my 
younger brother, Darren, was always my willing "lab technician," who availed himself 
during many crazy schemes. 
My graduate advisor, Dr. Colin MacLeod, allowed unstinted intellectual freedom 
and creativity while providing gentle guidance during my graduate career. My wonderful 
Ph.D. committee members, Drs. Myra Fernandes and Jonathan Fugelsang, and unofficial 
committee member, Stephanie Solcz, provided thoughtful and constructive advice and 
welcomed me into their offices at all times. I also am appreciative to the previous and 
current undergraduates in our lab who not only assisted in computer programming and 
data collection but who provided much-needed banter. 
I am very indebted to my friends. During the progress of my Ph.D., they provided 
stimulating conversations, were an abundant source of advice and support in all facets of 
life, and were my accomplices as we explored myriad nooks around the globe. 
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In a typical day, we engage in conversations with many different people. These 
social interactions place significant demands on memory both in terms of encoding and 
retrieval. Each person must not only attend to what the other person is saying but they 
must also keep track of their own responses. For example, you will want to remember 
that your conversational partner asked for a reprint of your article so that you can later 
follow up on this request, and you will also want to remember what you told her about 
your latest research endeavour so that you will not repeat yourself the next time you 
meet. 
The processes involved in remembering the source of information, in particular 
the person who imparted information to you during a conversation, have been 
comprehensively studied and are referred to in the literature as source memory (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). There is so much work on source memory that it now 
often is assigned its own chapter or a large portion of a chapter in textbooks (e.g., 
Radvansky, 2006). This dissertation explores the neglected half of the story—the 
processes involved in remembering the destination of information, such as who one told 
information to during a conversation. This will be referred to, by analogy, as destination 
memory.  
Source Memory 
Source memory has been extensively researched over the past 30 years using a 
variety of paradigms that have investigated whether subjects remember such source 
elements as the font (e.g., Kausler & Puckett, 1980), colour (e.g., Doerkson & 
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Shimamura, 2001; Macken, 2002; Park & Puglisi, 1985), origin (e.g., Cohen & Faulkner, 
1989; Craik, Morris, Morris, & Loewen, 1990; Shimamura & Squire, 1987), location 
(e.g., Cansino, Maquet, Dolan, & Rugg, 2002), speaker (e.g., Dodson, Holland, & 
Shimamura, 1998; Hicks & Marsh, 1999) and modality (Kausler & Puckett, 1981; 
Lehman & Mellinger, 1984, 1986) differently than the relevant piece of information (or 
item) itself. 
These studies provide evidence that memory for the source of information is 
dissociable from memory for the content—the to-be-remembered item. As always, the 
most compelling confirmation that encoding of item and source information is dissociable 
comes from experiments demonstrating that a single variable benefits memory for one yet 
impairs memory for the other. For example, Jurica and Shimamura (1999) demonstrated 
that an elaborative encoding task benefitted item memory yet impaired source memory. 
Consequently, item memory and source memory are not inherently unified: A variable 
that increases item memory does not necessarily increase source memory—and in fact, 
may even impair source memory. This conclusion is intuitively appealing because we are 
well aware that we can remember vast amounts of information without remembering 
from where or whom we originally acquired the knowledge. We also know that we can 
sometimes recall a source element despite not being able to recall the item information, as 
when we remember where on the page a fact was but are unable to recover the fact itself 
(Rothkopf, 1971).   
Neuropsychological evidence from brain-injured patients, neuroimaging, and 
aging studies also corroborate the claim that item memory and source memory are 
dissociable. Some amnesic patients have impaired source memory that is 
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disproportionately worse than their item memory performance (Schacter, Harbluk, & 
McLachlan, 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1987, 1991). Researchers also have shown that 
patients with circumscribed frontal lobe lesions, who are not grossly amnesic, perform 
just as well as controls on tests of item memory. By contrast, these same patients have 
impaired source memory (Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Johnson, O’Connor, & 
Cantor, 1997; Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990); thus, providing further support 
that item and source memory are distinct theoretical constructs which are mediated by 
different brain areas. 
Other scientists have not just argued for a dissociation but instead have 
championed the stronger view that there is a functional double dissociation between 
source and item memory. For example, Glisky and colleagues contend that item memory 
is more dependent on medial-temporal brain structures, whereas source memory is 
heavily reliant on regions in the frontal lobes (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995). 
Neuroimaging studies also support a source-item neuroanatomical distinction by 
demonstrating preferential frontal lobe activation during source memory tasks (Petrides, 
Alivisatos, & Evans, 1995; Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994), as do 
studies measuring event-related potentials in source memory tasks with healthy subjects 
(Johnson, Kounios, & Nolde, 1997; Senkfor & Van Petten, 1988; Van Petten, Senkfor, & 
Newberg, 2000). 
Source memory is more sensitive to age than is item memory (for a review see 
Spencer & Raz, 1994). As we age, memory for context generally declines precipitously, 
whereas memory for facts follows a shallower decline (Brown, Jones, & Davis, 1995; 
Craik, 1983; Ferguson, Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992; Henkel, Johnson, & DeLeonardis, 
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1998; McIntyre & Craik, 1987). Differences in source memory performance between 
younger and older adults have been found under a variety of source memory paradigms. 
For example, in determining the source of actions (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989), words 
(Hashtroudi, Chrosniak, & Johnson, 1989), fame (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990), learned 
location of words (Chalfone & Johnson, 1996), or the speaker of information (Rahhal, 
May, & Hasher, 2002), older adults perform disproportionately worse on measures of 
source memory when compared to younger adults. Therefore, another domain of 
research—aging—demonstrates that item and source memory are dissociable from each 
other.  
Many formal models of memory make a distinction between item and source 
memory (e.g., Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Bayen, Murname & Erdfelder, 1996). 
Specifically, researchers have proposed that source memory is episodic in nature. That is, 
successfully recognizing the source of information relies on our ability to recollect our 
past accurately, whereas recognition of item information is based on familiarity processes 
(e.g., Yonelinas, 1999). Therefore, item memory is less dependent on contextual 
information, whereas source memory is reliant on the encoding of information within a 
specific spatiotemporal context.  
A framework also exists to explain how we monitor the source of our memories. 
The source monitoring framework (SMF, Johnson, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000) states that we attribute sources to our 
memories by inferring the perceptual, semantic, and affective content of our thoughts, 
images, and feelings. For example, recollecting the deep, booming voice of a particular 
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acquaintance, his burly appearance, the summer breeze, and your thoughts and feelings at 
the time will all provide clues to various aspects of the source of this recollection. 
Overall, hundreds of studies have contributed to our understanding of how we 
remember who told us something or where we first encountered information—the source 
of information (see, e.g., Mitchell & Johnson, 2000, for a review). This makes sense, 
given the importance of remembering the source of information. For example, 
remembering that information was attained from a reputable television news program 
rather than an entertainment television show will determine how that information is used. 
In this situation, information learned from a news program may be shared with a 
colleague during an intellectual debate whereas information attained from a less reputable 
source may be withheld. However, the inverse situation—remembering who we told 
something to—is often important as well. For example, remembering what was said to a 
colleague is important for future interactions so that relevant information can be 
discussed later and that previously said information will not be repeated. Thus, it is 
surprising that we know very little about the processes involved in remembering the 
destination of information that we output, a situation that I have labelled destination 
memory. 
Destination Memory 
 Destination memory has been largely overlooked despite anecdotal reports that 
destination information may be more difficult to remember than is source information—
especially among older adults. We all know stories about, and likely have personal 
experience with, older people telling the same story repeatedly, indicative of recurring 
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failure of destination memory. However, destination memory is an issue for young adults 
as well:  Young university-aged adults perceive it as at least as problematic as source 
memory. In a survey that I conducted among 30 undergraduate students at the University 
of Waterloo, 43.3% of the respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement 
“I forget who I tell things to” (destination memory) and the same proportion of students 
also “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I lose track of who tells me what” 
(source memory). These same students perceived their destination memory and source 
memory as being fallible “sometimes” to “very often.” Clearly, destination memory 
problems are as much a concern for younger adults as are source memory issues. 
There are important social consequences of incorrectly remembering to whom one 
told something. In particular, there is social embarrassment in retelling a story or joke to 
the same person if one’s destination memory fails. Accurately remembering the 
destination of information is also important in the workplace. For example, supervisors 
need to remember to whom they told specific information or delegated specific tasks so 
that they may assess progress and accurately gauge their employees’ workloads. In the 
previously mentioned survey, 80.0% of undergraduate students reportedly repeat a story 
twice to the same person “sometimes” to “very often.” This aligns well with the intuition 
that destination memory errors are a frequent occurrence in everyday life. 
Destination memory also functions to facilitate our conversations. By 
remembering what we told others, we can assume a common ground in the conversation 
and continue where we last left off (cf. the given-new contract, Haviland & Clark, 1974). 
For example, if destination memory for the previous conversation is intact, one can 
introduce the topic of an upcoming test to a friend on an earlier occasion and then discuss 
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the results of the test on a later occasion without needing to discuss the test’s background 
again. A professor in a classroom experiences this problem when she cannot recall if she 
has already told her current class—as opposed to another class—about a study in the 
literature, or whether she has already used a particular illustration. 
 On a less commendable dimension, intact destination memory is also required for 
successful deception. For example, we can broadly classify lies into two categories: those 
that we tell to many people (e.g., actions that we believe are socially positive, such as that 
we recycle regularly when in fact we only wish we did) versus those that we tell to some 
people but not to others (e.g., lowering our age). It is this latter category that places a 
burden on destination memory because, to avoid getting caught, we need to keep track of 
who we tell what. Considered from this perspective, the psychopath must have, or must 
have cultivated, exceptional destination memory. 
On a theoretical level, destination memory shares a common feature with source 
memory: They are both part of the episodic memory system (see Tulving, 1983). Like 
source memory, destination memory is autobiographical because it is recollected in the 
context of a certain time and place with reference to oneself as a participant in the 
episode. However, source and destination memory are fundamentally different in terms of 
the direction of information transfer—“output” in the case of destination memory and 
“input” in the case of source memory. A fundamental question is whether the direction in 
which information is exchanged has consequences in terms of memory performance and 




Item Memory vs Associative Memory 
On the surface, both destination memory and source memory are a type of 
associative memory. They both rely on remembering relations among individual items of 
information so that at retrieval these relations can be assembled to form the previously 
encoded episode. Simple examples of associative memory include remembering words 
that were paired together, remembering the colour of objects, and remembering the 
location of objects. This is contrasted with item memory, which is the remembering of 
individual items such as the words or objects without knowledge of other information that 
was associated with them at encoding. For example, item memory is remembering that 
one saw a chair whereas associative memory is remembering that one saw a chair near a 
tree. 
Numerous experiments have shown differences between item and associative 
information. For instance, they have different time courses at retrieval (Gronlund & 
Ratcliff, 1989; Nobel & Shiffrin, 2001) and different forgetting rates (Hockley, 1991, 
1992; Murdock & Hockley, 1989), they are differentially affected by aging (Chalfonte & 
Johnson, 1996; Naveh-Benjamin, 2000), and they rely on different neuroanatomical 
regions (Eichenbaum & Bunsey, 1995; Kirwan & Stark, 2004; Klingberg, Roland, & 
Kawashima, 1994; Yonelinas, Hopfinger, Buonocore, Kroll, & Baynes, 2001).   
Of particular relevance for destination memory and source memory is the finding 
that different recognition processes contribute in different ways to item memory and 
associative memory. Dual-process theories of memory assume that recognition judgments 
are based on recollection and familiarity processes (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Jacoby 
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& Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002). Recollection is a conscious awareness 
of qualitative information from the study episode, whereas familiarity reflects a sense of 
knowing only that an item has been previously encountered without being aware of the 
contextual details surrounding the learning episode. Yonelinas (1997) found evidence that 
item memory relies on a combination of recollection and familiarity processes, whereas 
associative memory relies primarily on recollection. Because destination memory and 
source memory are a type of associative memory, then successful retrieval of destination 
memory and source memory is dependent on intact recollection or episodic memory.  
Current Research Rationale 
Performance for destination memory and source memory will be similar to the 
extent that recollection levels are comparable for them. Because destination and source 
memory are both types of associative memory, then one might naively assume that 
destination memory and source memory should not differ in terms of their success or 
their fallibility. That is, destination memory and source memory errors ought to be 
committed to the same extent because both are associative in nature.  
Of importance, though, recollection performance critically depends on how 
information was encoded. For example, recollection is particularly susceptible to an 
increase in memory load at encoding (Yonelinas, 1994; Yonlinas & Jacoby, 1994), and is 
especially disrupted by divided attention during study (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, 
& Anderson, 1996). Differences in how information is transferred at encoding—outgoing 
versus incoming—result in a disparity in how environmental context is encoded. Past 
research has shown that outgoing information is not as well integrated with the 
10 
 
environmental context as is incoming information (Koriat, Ben-Zur, & Druch, 1991). 
This has consequences for episodic retrieval because recollection is aided by context 
(Gopie, 2005). 
As an alternative to the naive account, it is proposed in this thesis that destination 
memory and source memory should differ in terms of their success and their fallibility. 
Extrapolating from Koriat et al. (1991), this is expected to occur because incoming 
information is better integrated with its source compared to the integration of outgoing 
information with its destination. The reason for better association between the person and 
the information in source memory compared to destination memory is a result of how 
conscious attention is directed at encoding. When people impart information, they are 
focused on the processes required to transmit information (cf. Zimmer & Engelkamp, 
1989), which leaves fewer attentional resources to associate the outgoing information 
with the person that one is telling it to. Consequently, it is anticipated that destination 
memory is more fallible than source memory because context is better integrated with 
source memory than with destination memory. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to develop a paradigm to successfully investigate 
destination memory in the laboratory (Experiment 1); to determine whether destination 
memory is more prone to errors than source memory because of the difference regarding 
how information is transferred at encoding (Experiment 2); and to investigate the 
mechanisms underlying these error differences by manipulating encoding factors that are 
hypothesized to influence how destination memory items are associated with each other 
(Experiments 3 & 4). Overall, this inaugural exploration of destination memory will 
highlight the significance of destination memory as a distinct component of the episodic 
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memory system, and will complement source memory research by furthering our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which episodic memories are encoded.  
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Experiment 1: Destination Memory Paradigm 
To critically examine destination memory, a paradigm is needed to investigate the 
phenomenon in the laboratory. Developing such a paradigm was the primary objective of 
Experiment 1. 
 An important goal was to test memory for item and destination information using 
tests that are as analogous as possible, unlike the common error committed in the source 
memory literature of using different assessment procedures. As Chalfonte and Johnson 
(1996) noted, most source memory experiments employ yes/no or forced-choice 
recognition tests to determine whether people remember the item. By contrast, memory 
for source features is usually assessed with cued recall tests (e.g., Ferguson et al., 1992; 
Kausler & Puckett, 1981; Zelinski & Light, 1988). Observed memory differences 
between item and source memory may therefore be a consequence of test type. Cued 
recall tests are generally more difficult than recognition tests (Craik, 1977; Craik & 
McDowd, 1987; Light & LaVoie, 1993), likely because they put greater weight on 
retrieval operations and provide, in Craik’s (1986) analysis, less environmental support.  
Another common pitfall that occurs in source memory research consists of 
assessing source memory only when individuals are correct in identifying the item. For 
example, only after indicating that a studied word was ‘old’ will subjects be questioned 
about the word’s print colour (e.g., Mulligan, 2004, Experiment 1) or location (e.g., 
Meiser & Bröder, 2002, Experiment 1) at the time of study trial. Consequently, to 
identify source features, participants must also have intact item memory performance. 
However, daily experience suggests that this is a very constrained view. In reality, we are 
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often able to remember the source (or the destination) of our memory but not remember 
the content of what was said. For example, we may remember speaking to a particular 
acquaintance a year ago but not recall the specifics of the conversation. 
Both of these critical issues plaguing source memory research were addressed in 
Experiment 1’s destination memory paradigm. First, to address the pitfalls of the 
common practice of using different tests to make memory comparisons, a standard 
recognition memory test was adopted throughout the destination memory paradigm. 
Second, destination memory was not assessed only after participants identified an item as 
being old:  Instead it was assessed separately from item memory for a non-overlapping 
subset of studied items.  
The destination memory paradigm required participants to tell various facts (e.g., 
“The average person falls asleep in 12 minutes”) to pictures of famous people (e.g., Tom 
Cruise), with the fact preceding the face on a computer monitor. Each famous person was 
told a single unique fact. This phase is analogous to the standard encoding component in 
many memory experiments. Afterward, participants’ memories for the facts, faces, and 
fact-face linkages were assessed using the same type of test—a yes/no recognition 
memory test for the item or for the association. The order of these two tests was 
counterbalanced. 
In the item memory test, some previously seen and new facts and faces were 
individually presented on the screen and participants were asked to make a yes/no 
judgment to indicate whether they had said that fact or seen that face during study. 
Therefore, this recognition test provided independent memory judgments for what people 
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said and who they saw (and told facts to), which is another beneficial feature of this 
paradigm, because destination memory errors could be pinpointed to a specific locus (i.e., 
disproportionate faulty memory for the faces or for the facts or both). 
 The associative memory recognition test assessed the critical research question: 
How well do people remember who they told something to? Here, the emphasis was on 
the fact-face connections.  Participants were shown another subset of previously seen 
facts and faces that did not overlap with the stimuli used on the item recognition test. 
However, now the computer monitor simultaneously displayed a face and fact on screen, 
and people made yes/no decisions about whether they had told that displayed fact to that 
famous person during study.  
Overall, Experiment 1’s destination memory paradigm allowed for an assessment 
of a complex memory event by independently evaluating people’s memories for 
individual items in an episode (i.e., item memory), and by determining whether people 
are able to accurately relate pieces of information that were encountered together during 
the acquisition episode (i.e., associative memory). It is anticipated that people will be 
better at recognizing individual items from an episode compared to recognizing relations 
among items, the latter representing destination memory. This should be the case because 
recognition of item information relies on either familiarity or recollection processes 
whereas associative information is predominantly based on the more effortful of the two 





Subjects. Twenty students from Introductory Psychology at the University of 
Waterloo received bonus credit in the course for taking part in the experiment. Subjects in 
all experiments were independent samples. All of the experiments were approved by the 
University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics, and all participants gave informed 
consent prior to participation. 
Stimuli. The fact item pool (Appendix A) consisted of 60 interesting facts that 
were culled from various Internet resources. The face item pool (Appendix B) consisted 
of 60 pictures of famous people anticipated to be familiar to an undergraduate through 
television, sports, music, movies, or politics. The pictures were also gathered from 
various Internet resources. All stimuli were presented in 14-pt lower case white font 
against a black background. 
From the pool of 60 facts and faces, a random 50 facts and faces were selected to 
be paired for study. On the associative recognition test, 40 fact-face pairings were shown 
in random order, with 20 fact-face pairs presented in their original pairing and the other 
20 presented re-paired, as is traditionally done on associative recognition tests, to 
minimize participants’ use of response strategies (e.g., Hockley, 1992; Naveh-Benjamin, 
Guez, & Marom, 2003). That is, if the pair was composed of one new item and one old 
item then participants only need to recognize that one member of the pair was new to 
respond ‘new’. By contrast, participants could not adopt this strategy on a test that is 




 The remaining 10 facts and 10 faces from study, together with 10 new facts and 
10 new faces, were presented individually in the item recognition test in a random order. 
In this way, the two tests used entirely non-overlapping sets of stimuli, preventing 
contamination. 
Apparatus. An IBM-compatible microcomputer with a 15-inch color monitor was 
used for testing. The controlling program was written in E-Prime (version 1.1, Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Procedure. In the study phase, participants were instructed to tell facts to faces.  
Each trial consisted of a fact screen followed by a face screen, with subjects told to read 
the fact silently and then to press the spacebar to reveal the person that they would now 
tell the fact to aloud. Study trial presentation began with a 1000-ms white fixation cross 
(“+”) on a black background at the center of the screen. The fact was then presented in 
white font at the center of the screen. Once the subject read the fact silently, they pressed 
the spacebar which resulted in a black blank screen for 250-ms, followed by a colour 
picture of a famous person at the center of the screen. The subject was to tell the person 
aloud the fact that they had just read and then to press the spacebar. This initiated the 
appearance of another black blank screen for 250-ms. This procedure repeated until the 
subject had told all 50 facts to 50 separate faces. 
The next two phases were the counterbalanced recognition memory tests. For the 
item memory test, facts and faces were randomly ordered and individually presented at 
the center of the screen, with facts being in white font and faces in colour. A test face or 
fact stayed on the screen until the subject indicated, by pressing a keyboard button for 
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Yes (the “c” key) or No (the “m” key), whether they had previously seen the item. Once a 
response was made, a black blank screen was displayed for 250-ms followed by the next 
test trial.  
For the associative memory test, a face and a fact were presented simultaneously 
on the screen, with the fact appearing below the face. Participants decided whether they 
had told that fact to that face by pressing either the Yes (the “c” key) or No (the “m” key) 
button. Once a response was made, a black blank screen was displayed for 250-ms 
followed by the next test trial. After the recognition memory tests, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 Table 1 presents the recognition data expressed as proportions of hits and false 
alarms, accompanied by their respective standard errors in parentheses below each mean. 
The dependent variable calculated for each subject was a corrected recognition score 
(proportion hits minus proportion false alarms). Corrected recognition scores are 
routinely used for interpretation purposes in source memory research (e.g., Chalfonte & 
Johnson, 1996; Chalfonte, Verfaellie, Johnson, & Reiss, 1996; Johnson, Nolde, 
DeLeonardis, 1996) and recognition memory research in general (e.g., Castel & Craik, 
2003; Jones & Jacoby, 2001). Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for 
individual face memory, individual fact memory, and destination memory (i.e., fact and 
fact recognition memory) are shown in Figure 1.  Note that corresponding analyses on the 
signal detection measure d’ using the formula provided by Brophy (1986) were also 
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conducted in all cases. Because these consistently led to the same conclusions throughout 
this thesis, these analyses will not be presented. 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing face memory, fact memory, 
and destination memory showed a significant overall effect, F(2, 57) = 73.70, MSE = 
.017, p < .001. To further explore the relations among face memory, fact memory, and 
destination memory, t-tests were conducted to compare memory for individual facts and 
faces to destination memory. Results indicated that memory for faces [t(19) = 8.47, p < 
.001] and memory for facts [t(19) = 13.52, p < .001] were both significantly better than 
destination memory. Subjects also had better memory for facts than faces [t(19) = 4.41, p 
< .001].  
 Pearson correlations were computed to assess the extent to which item and 
associative recognition memory performances were related. Neither fact memory (r = -
.18) nor face memory (r = .39) was significantly correlated with destination memory 
(both ps > .05), nor were fact and face memory correlated with each other (r = .04, p > 
.05). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 evaluated subjects’ memories for complex events in which they told 
different facts to different famous people. Two notable results emerged. First, people 
were quite accurate at recognizing the faces to which they told the facts, and at 
recognizing the facts that they told to the faces. This is important because memory for a 
complex event, such as remembering what you said to someone, relies on intact memory 
for individual episodic features. Second, people were surprisingly poor at remembering 
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what they said to whom—the associative information—despite their high accuracy in 
remembering the faces and facts tested individually. Clearly, memories of the features of 
an episodic event are not unified or automatically associated with each other (e.g., 
Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). Critically, this experiment demonstrated, for the first time, 
that destination memory is very fallible. This finding is consistent with anecdotal 
accounts that people have difficulties remembering what they told to whom. 
Importantly for this dissertation, Experiment 1 demonstrated the utility of this 
novel paradigm in assessing destination memory. Confounds that are common in source 
memory experiments were addressed. In particular, all memory tests were consistent: 
Yes/no recognition tests were used throughout. This minimized performance differences 
that could have been caused by the task demands of the test. Moreover, this paradigm was 
unique because it assessed not just item memory for the facts that were said but also 
independently tested item memory for the person that subjects told things to. 
Consequently, it was possible to determine whether subjects’ difficulty with destination 
memory was due to poor memory for components of the episode or due to poor 
integration of these components. Finally, destination memory was assessed independently 
of whether subjects remembered either piece of item information: fact or face. Therefore, 
the destination memory test was not contaminated because there was no prior assessment 
of memory for individual items that were on the destination memory test. Armed with 
this simple yet effective paradigm, it was now possible to investigate destination memory 
systematically in the laboratory. 
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Experiment 2: Destination Memory vs Source Memory 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that people can have very good memory for the 
individual components of a destination episode and yet show quite poor destination 
memory. People were able to remember the set of facts they told and the set of faces they 
told facts to quite accurately. However, their destination memory—knowing what they 
said to whom—was substantially worse than their memory for the individual items. This 
laboratory outcome is consistent with people’s interactions in the real world. People 
know a particular piece of information and they know that they interacted with someone 
but are sometimes unable to recollect whether they previously told that particular person 
the information that they have in mind. This memory problem is not unique to destination 
memory; it occurs with source memory as well, and may be characteristic of associative 
memory more generally. Although both source memory and destination memory are 
fallible, are they fallible to the same extent or for the same reasons? 
At the core, source memory and destination memory are different in terms of 
direction of information transfer. People receive information in source memory, whereas 
they transmit information in destination memory. To remember the source episode later, 
people must keep a record of the incoming stimuli from individuals who are providing 
them with information. By contrast, to remember the destination episode later, people 
must keep a record of their own actions. These different processes that record incoming 
and outgoing information may lead to differences in memory performance for destination 
memory and source memory. In particular, experiments that examine memory for output 
information, such as with subject-performed tasks, suggest that incoming versus outgoing 
information is remembered differently. 
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Research over the last 25 years has consistently shown that people have better 
memories for phrases they act out than for those they simply receive (e.g., Cohen, 1981; 
Engelkamp, 1990; see Engelkamp, 1998; Nilsson, 2000; or Zimmer, 2001, for reviews). 
For example, people remember phrases such as break the toothpick or bounce a ball 
better when those phrases are acted out compared to when they are simply read or 
listened to without acting them out. This memory advantage, or the enactment effect, is 
found on both recall tests and recognition tests. However, although enactment results in 
superior memory for the phrases (the items), it may not result in better memory—and 
may even impair memory—for other types of information during the learning episode. 
For example, memory for temporal order is impaired by enacting the phrase (Engelkamp 
& Dehn, 2000; Olofsson, 1996).  
Of particular relevance is a study by Koriat, Ben-Zur, and Druch (1991) in which 
output events disrupted the encoding of context. Koriat et al. contrasted item memory 
with context memory for self-performed compared to other-performed tasks. In their 
second experiment, they had participants perform or watch someone else perform a set of 
mini-tasks, such as raising their hands or stirring water in a cup. All participants 
performed and watched these tasks in a particular room during phase one and were told to 
leave the room for a few minutes when they were done. In phase two, participants either 
were brought back to the same room or went to a different room where they performed 
and watched additional tasks. Afterward, participants were asked to classify the tasks as 
having been in phase one, in phase two, or in neither (“new”). All participants were tested 
in a room that was not used for either of the study phases. 
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The results of Koriat et al. (1991) indicated that people had better memory for the 
task when they had produced a response than when they had observed a response, as is 
typically found in enactment effect research. Of particular interest, however, was the 
finding that participants’ memory for the context of self-performed tasks was worse than 
their context memory for other-performed tasks. On this basis, Koriat et al. (1991) 
proposed that output events are not as well integrated with their environmental context as 
are input events. They argued that this occurs because incoming sources, which are 
external to the person, form rich associative links between the event and its contextual, 
spatiotemporal environment. By contrast, Koriat et al. explained that output events are 
less strongly integrated with their environmental context than are input events because 
the person perceives their own behaviour as belonging more to themselves than to the 
external environment. Consequently, the person cognitively organizes their behaviour 
with their internal mental processes rather than with the external environment. 
Reduced environmental contextualization of self-performed tasks has been found 
with simpler cognitive tasks as well. In an interesting example with imagined self-
performed tasks (Engelkamp, Zimmer, & Denis, 1989), participants studied pairs of 
action verbs and were told either to imagine performing the actions or to imagine 
someone else performing the actions. Participants’ memory performance was equivalent 
for cued recall and free recall when they imagined someone else performing the actions. 
However, self-performed instructions resulted in worse memory for cued recall than for 
free recall. Therefore, the relational integration of each target word with its contextual 
cue was undermined as a result of self-performance encoding. 
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In general, the research described here suggests that destination memory should 
be more fallible than source memory because outgoing information is not as well 
integrated with its context (i.e., the person to whom one is telling a fact) as is incoming 
information. For the first time, Experiment 2 directly compared source memory and 
destination memory, investigating whether destination memory is more error-prone than 
source memory, which would also provide experimental confirmation of anecdotal 
reports that remembering destination memory is especially difficult. Such a finding 
would provide preliminary evidence of differences between source memory and 
destination memory at encoding. To accomplish this goal, the destination memory 
paradigm was adjusted, with a very simple manipulation, so that famous faces ‘told’ facts 
to participants in a source memory condition whereas, as in Experiment 1, participants 
told facts to faces in the destination memory condition. A between-subjects design was 
used to eliminate any confusion among participants regarding the transmission of 
information in the case of a mixed within-participants design and to eliminate order 
effects in the case of a blocked within-participants design. 
Method 
Subjects. Fifty-two students from Introductory Psychology at the University of 
Waterloo received bonus credit in the course for taking part in the experiment. None had 
taken part in Experiment 1. Participants were randomly assigned to each study instruction 




Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure for the destination instruction condition was also 
identical to Experiment 1. For the source instruction condition, the procedure was subtly 
modified. Participants in this condition were instructed that facts would be told to them 
by famous people. This was accomplished by having the famous person precede the fact 
for each person-fact pairing. Participants pressed the spacebar to read a fact on the screen 
after they viewed the famous person. All subsequent instructions and timings were 
identical to Experiment 1 for both groups of participants except for the associative 
memory test. The source instruction participants decided whether a person told them a 
fact whereas the destination instruction group, as in Experiment 1, decided whether they 
told a fact to a person. After the experiment was completed, participants were debriefed 
and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 Table 2A presents the source instruction condition recognition data and Table 2B 
presents the destination instruction condition recognition data expressed as proportions of 
hits and false alarms, accompanied by their respective standard errors in parentheses 
below each mean. As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable calculated for each subject 
was a corrected recognition score (proportion hits minus proportion false alarms). 
Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face memory, individual 
fact memory, source memory, and destination memory are shown in Figure 2.  
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 Corrected recognition data were submitted to a 2 X 3 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with study condition (destination or source) as the between-subjects factor 
and test condition (face, fact, face and fact) as the within-subject factors. There were 
significant main effects for study condition, F(1,50) = 10.05, MSE = .035, p < .01, and 
test condition, F(2,50) = 104.12, MSE = .020, p < .01, as well as a significant interaction 
of study condition with test condition, F(2,50) = 8.27, MSE = .020, p < .01. 
To further explore this interaction, one-way ANOVAs compared the effect of 
study instruction on each of the test conditions. Results indicated that participants in the 
source instruction condition had better face recognition than those in the destination 
instruction condition, F(1,50) = 17.10, MSE = .027, p < .001, and that fact recognition 
performance was equivalent for the source instruction and destination instruction groups, 
F(1,50) = 0.88, MSE = .013, p > .05. Critically, source memory performance was better 
than destination memory performance, F(1,50) = 6.03, MSE = .035, p < .02.  
Pearson correlations were computed to assess the extent to which item and 
associative recognition memory performances were related. Neither fact memory (r = -
.02) nor face memory (r = .10) was significantly correlated with source memory (both ps 
> .05) nor were they correlated with each other (r = -.21, p > .05). In the destination 
memory condition, face memory was correlated with fact memory (r = .65, p < .01) and 
the reason that this was the only significant correlation across all four experiments is 
unknown. However, neither fact memory (r = .29, p > .05) nor face memory (r = .24, p > 





Research previously examined how memory for source information is affected by 
performing motor actions or interacting with objects to determine the role of action on 
later memory. The current experiment did not use objects or have people perform 
different actions, nor was it limited to investigating only source memory. Experiment 2, 
for the first time, directly compared destination memory and source memory using the 
same stimuli and procedure except for one key manipulation: In the destination 
procedure, participants told facts to famous people whereas in the source procedure, 
participants were told facts by famous people. Of particular importance in the 
development of a new paradigm, the destination group replicated the results from 
Experiment 1, thereby providing support for the reliability of the destination paradigm in 
experimental research. 
In terms of memory for individual item information, people were once again quite 
good under both the destination instruction and the source instruction conditions. Overall, 
recognition performance was relatively good for individual items and faces for both 
conditions. It is also fascinating that individual recognition of facts and faces was non-
predictive of destination memory or source memory performance. Destination memory 
and source memory performances were substantially poorer than the worst individual 
item memory performance. Therefore, details of a contextualized episodic event—at least 
for those assessed here—are not automatically encoded as a unified memory trace nor are 
they automatically associated with each other. 
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Although the result of the important comparison between destination memory and 
source memory was consistent with prediction, it was nonetheless rather surprising. The 
difference between destination memory and source memory was quite large: Destination 
memory accuracy was about 12% lower than source memory accuracy. On a fundamental 
level, people were doing something very similar in both the destination and source 
conditions: forming an episodic memory by relating fact and person information to each 
other in a spatiotemporal context. However, the similarities end here: These results 
indicate that outgoing information is less integrated with its environmental context (i.e., 
the person) compared to incoming information. Moreover, compared to previous research 
(e.g., Koriat et al., 1991), the current experiment demonstrated that output is not just 
disruptive when it comes to associating the item with the physical environmental context 
(e.g., laboratory room) but also disrupts the associative memory between separate items 
within the environment. That is, transmitting information—in this case, telling facts—
disrupts the associative processes by which independent items (i.e., facts and faces) are 
related to each other within a spatiotemporal context. In the present experiment, when 
information is transmitted, the fact-face association is accomplished less efficiently than 
when information is received. What causes reduced associative memory in the destination 
memory condition compared to the source memory condition?  
The processes involved in association or binding of information are poorly 
understood, but it has been proposed that associative memory relies on conscious 
attentional processes (Moscovitch, 2000). Support for associative memory relying on the 




Normal aging is accompanied by a reduction in attentional resources (Craik, 
1983; Craik & Byrd, 1982; Craik & Simon, 1980), which leaves even fewer resources 
available to consciously associate independent information from an episode together. 
Consequently, older adults are less able to integrate items with their contexts of 
occurrence (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). Naveh-Benjamin (2000) has even proposed that 
older adults’ memory problems are due to a deficiency in creating and retrieving 
associations between individual items of information (i.e., associative deficit hypothesis). 
Similarly, when younger adults’ attention is divided at encoding, they should also have 
impairments with associative memory for the learning episode because their conscious 
attentional resources are compromised by the distracting task. This is precisely what is 
found: Younger adults’ memory performance is worse under divided-attention conditions 
compared to full-attention conditions, with the deficit in associative memory being 
greater than the deficit in item memory (Castel & Craik, 2003; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996). Therefore, there is strong support that conscious attention 
at encoding is necessary for intact associative memory. 
The proposal for why destination memory is worse than source memory also 
relates to the amount of conscious attentional resources devoted to the fact-face pairing at 
encoding because both destination memory and source memory are instances of 
associative memory. When participants tell facts to people, their attention is focused on 
the processes required to transmit information (cf. Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1989). Because 
destination actions are self-generated, the person’s focus is on themselves, which leaves 
fewer attentional resources available to associate the fact to the person that one is telling 
it to. This reduction of conscious attentional processes results in relatively weaker fact-
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person integration for destination events. By contrast, incoming information establishes 
rich associative linkages between the information and its environment because incoming 
information is thought to be psychologically construed as part of the environment (Koriat 
et al., 1991). That is, when attention is directed to the incoming information it is also 
directed to the person who is providing the information. Attention to both the fact and 
person will benefit the association of the fact-face pairing. Therefore, as was confirmed in 
Experiment 2, associative memory for the fact-face pairing is worse for destination 
memory compared to source memory. 
Based on the idea that destination memory errors are committed more often than 
source memory errors because attentional resources are more self-focused in the case of 
destination, it should be possible to impair or improve destination memory by 
manipulating factors that influence how people direct their attention. In particular, 
destination memory should worsen as self-focus increases because fewer attentional 
resources are available to adequately form associative linkages between the fact and face. 
This was investigated in Experiment 3. An interesting and socially valuable situation, in 
terms of practical application, arises if we can improve destination memory. Specifically, 
if attentional resources are directed to the fact-face pairing at encoding, then destination 




Experiment 3: Impairing Destination Memory 
Remembering a complex episode depends on the successful retrieval of 
independent items and the associations between these independent items within that 
experience. Therefore, situations which detract from establishing associative linkages 
between independent items within an event will result in impoverished memory for that 
prior occurrence. For example, the source memory literature provides abundant evidence 
indicating that impoverished encoding situations result in deficits in episodic memory 
retrieval. Thus, stress or divided attention (e.g., Troyer, Winocur, Craik, & Moscovitch, 
1999), aging (e.g., McIntyre & Craik, 1987), and brain injury (e.g., Schacter, Harbluk, & 
McLachlan, 1984) all interfere with associative processes during encoding of an episode. 
Experiment 3 was designed to further examine the hypothesis that transmitting 
information disrupts integrative processes that link independent units of information (i.e., 
the face and fact) from a destination episode. This occurs because, when we output 
information, attentional resources are directed at the processes involved in transmitting 
information. In the case of destination memory, the focus is unavoidably on oneself 
because the information that is being transferred is self-produced, which leaves fewer 
encoding resources available to associate the outputted information with its target. In 
their analysis of “working-with-memory” tasks, Moscovitch and Winocur (1992) support 
the view that associative memory requires a greater expenditure of resources compared to 
individual item information. Moreover, Hockley and Cristi (1996) showed that item 
memory was unimpaired when associative information was emphasized at encoding, 
whereas associative memory was impaired when attention was directed to the encoding 
of item information. This result coupled with the previously mentioned research that 
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demonstrated associative memory was impaired when attention was divided (Troyer, 
Winocur, Craik, & Moscovitch, 1999) provide evidence that associative memory requires 
more attention than item memory. Therefore, if the transmission of information increases 
one’s self-focus, then there should also be an increase in destination memory errors 
because fewer attention resources will be available to associate the fact with the person 
one is telling it to.  
Therefore, the objective of Experiment 3 was to determine whether self-focus 
diverts attention away from associating a particular fact with the person to whom one is 
speaking. Past studies increased self-focus by having participants focus on their own 
emotional states (e.g., Johnson, Nolde, & De Leonardis, 1996). In this study, to increase 
self-focus while keeping the paradigm similar to the one used in Experiments 1 and 2, 
participants simply told personal facts about themselves, rather than arbitrary facts, to 
famous faces. If self-focus is responsible for destination memory errors, then destination 
memory should be impaired compared to Experiment 1, in which people told non-
personal facts to famous faces.  
 Method 
Subjects. Twenty students from Introductory Psychology at the University of 
Waterloo received bonus credit in the course for taking part in the experiment. None had 
taken part in any other related experiments. 
Stimuli. The fact item pool (Appendix C) consisted of 60 fact cues, each with a 
blank portion at the end for participants to fill in their personal answer. An example of a 
personal fact cue would be “My zodiac sign is...” The face item pool was exactly the 
32 
 
same as in the previous experiments. All fact stimuli were presented in 14-pt lower case 
white font against a black background. 
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to that used in the prior experiments. 
Procedure. The procedure was virtually identical to the destination memory 
condition used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 with one modification that was made 
during the encoding phase. Participants were told that they would see the beginning of a 
fact—a fact cue—which they were instructed to silently read and fill in with their 
personalized answer. It was emphasized to participants that they should have their 
personal fact in mind before they pressed the spacebar to display a face. This was done to 
avoid having a generation component during the fact-face association because the effect 
of generation on associative information is not entirely clear (e.g., see Mulligan, 2004 and 
Marsh, Edelman, & Bower, 2001 for conflicting results).  
Study trial presentation began with a 1000-ms white fixation cross (“+”) on a 
black background at the center of screen. The fact cue was presented in white font at the 
center of the screen. Once the participant read and generated the answer to the fact 
silently, they pressed the spacebar which resulted in a black blank screen for 250-ms 
followed by a picture of a famous person at the center of the screen. The participant was 
to tell the person aloud the entire personal fact (e.g., “My zodiac sign is Pisces”) and then 
to press the spacebar. This initiated the appearance of another black blank screen for 250-
ms. This procedure repeated until the participant had told all 50 personal facts to 50 faces. 
The remainder of the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, with the 
fact cue (e.g., “My zodiac sign is…”) being displayed instead of the full fact during both 
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the item and associate recognition tests. This was another way that the influence of 
generation on recognition memory was controlled because the generated portion of the 
personal fact was never tested; instead, only the fact cue was tested on the recognition 
tests. 
For the item memory test, fact cues and faces were randomly ordered and 
individually presented at the center of the screen, with fact cues being in white font and 
faces in colour. A test face or fact cue stayed on the screen until the subject indicated, by 
pressing a keyboard button for Yes (the “c” key) or No (the “m” key), whether they had 
previously seen it. Once a response was made, a black blank screen was displayed for 
250-ms followed by the next test trial. 
For the associative memory test, a face and a fact cue were presented 
simultaneously on the screen, with the fact cue appearing below the face. Participants 
decided whether they had told that fact to that face by pressing either the Yes (the “c” 
key) or No (the “m” key) button. Once a response was made, a black blank screen was 
displayed for 250-ms followed by the next test trial. After the recognition memory tests, 
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Table 3 presents the increased self-focus recognition data expressed as 
proportions of hits and false alarms, accompanied by their respective standard errors in 
parentheses below each mean. As in prior experiments, the dependent variable calculated 
for each subject was a corrected recognition score (proportion hits minus proportion false 
alarms). The pattern of results for Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2. 
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Therefore, Experiment 1 was treated as the between-subjects control condition in 
Experiment 3. Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face 
memory and individual fact memory are shown in Figure 3.  
 Corrected recognition data were submitted to a 2 X 3 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with self-focus (high or low) as the between-subjects factor and test condition 
(face, fact, face and fact) as the within-subject factors. There were significant main 
effects of self-focus, F(1,38) = 11.46, MSE = .027, p < .01, and test condition, F(2,76) = 
165.04, MSE = .022, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction of self-focus with test 
condition, F(2,76) = 7.07, MSE = .022, p < .01. 
To further explore this interaction, one-way ANOVAs compared the effect of 
self-focus separately on each of the test conditions. Results indicated that participants 
performed similarly on individual face recognition, F(1,38) = .028, MSE = .036, p > .05, 
but participants in the low self-focus group (from Experiment 1) performed slightly better 
on individual fact recognition than those in the high self-focus group, F(1,38) = 6.95, 
MSE = .008, p < .05. Critically, high self-focus was associated with increased destination 
memory errors (destination memory M = .21, SE = .04) over that seen for low self-focus 
(in Experiment 1; destination memory M = .45, SE = .03), F(1,38) =20.43, MSE = .028, p 
< .001. 
Pearson correlations were computed to assess the extent to which item and 
associative recognition memory performances were related. In the low self-focus 
condition, neither fact memory (r = -.18) nor face memory (r = .39) was significantly 
correlated with destination memory (both ps > .05), nor were they significantly correlated 
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with each other (r = .04, p > .05). Similarly, in the high self-focus memory condition, 
face memory was not correlated with fact memory (r = -.05, p > .05), and neither fact 
memory (r = -.25, p > .05) nor face memory (r = .17, p > .05) was significantly correlated 
with destination memory. 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that self-focus is detrimental to 
destination memory. When people’s self-focus was increased by telling personal facts to 
faces, their destination memory performance suffered quite dramatically, despite 
individual item information being unaffected. This is consistent with Hockley and Cristi’s 
(1996) finding that associative memory is more attention-demanding than item memory. 
When people focus on themselves, more destination memory errors are made, possibly 
because fewer encoding resources are available to associate independent pieces of 
information—such as what you said and who you said it to—together from the 
destination episode.  
Self-focus has been previously manipulated in psychological experiments using 
external objects, such as mirrors, video cameras, or voice recordings (e.g., Walter, 2007; 
Wicklund & Duval, 1971), and by having participants focus on their affective states (e.g., 
Cryder, Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008; Johnson et al.,1996; Zimring, 1985; Zimring & 
Katz, 1988). In the study by Johnson et al. (1996), for example, they found that when 
people were focused on their own emotions, their memory for identifying which of two 
speakers told them a statement (e.g., “The President of the United States is the most 
powerful man in the world”) was poorer compared to the condition in which they were 
36 
 
focused on how the speaker felt. Therefore, focusing on one’s own emotions led to 
increased source misattributions. 
Those results coupled with the results from the current experiment are suggestive 
of a more general theory: Self-focus, irrespective of emotional content, detracts from 
establishing connections among independent features from a complex memory episode 
because fewer attentional resources are available to integrate the independent features 
together. Johnson and colleagues did concede that they were not against the idea that 
other manipulations would impair (or promote) the association of features to form 
complex memories but they would probably be surprised that a very common task, such 
as telling someone facts, would have such a negative effect on associating separate 
features from a memory episode. They might be even more surprised that, when those 
facts heighten self-focus, there is even further impairment to destination memory. 
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Experiment 4: Improving Destination Memory 
 Destination memory is more fallible than source memory. Retrieval of destination 
memory and source memory associations is dependent on the quality of the events that 
were initially recorded. Situations which detract from establishing or forming associative 
linkages between independent events of an episode will necessarily result in reduced 
associative memory performance. Destination memory is especially error-prone 
compared to source memory because of weak integration of the fact and person pairing at 
encoding. This is due to attention being focused on the internal processes involved in 
outputting information in the case of the destination episode, emphasizing the internal 
context—oneself—instead of the external context—the other person to whom you were 
transmitting the information.  
 Based on this framework, it should be possible to improve destination memory 
by shifting the focus of attention away from oneself and more toward the fact-face 
pairing.  The objective of Experiment 4 was to improve destination memory by directing 
participants’ attention outward toward the person to whom they tell a fact. By shifting 
attention away from oneself and toward the face while telling the fact to the face, the 
associative linkage between fact and face should be enhanced. This shift in attention was 
accomplished by having participants in one experimental group say the name of the 
famous person before they told them the fact (e.g., “Oprah Winfrey, the United States 
postal service handles 40% of the world’s mail volume”), thereby shifting the focus of 
attention from themselves to the person that they are telling things to. The control group 




Subjects. Forty-two students from Introductory Psychology at the University of 
Waterloo received bonus credit in the course for taking part in the experiment. None had 
taken part in any other related experiments. Participants were randomly assigned to study 
condition, with 19 in the refocus memory condition and 23 in the control destination 
memory condition. A new control group was used because there was an additional phase 
to the normal procedure, which is described below. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli and apparatus were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. To accomplish the shift of attention, participants in the refocus group 
were required to say the famous person’s name aloud before telling the fact to that 
person. This required that people know the names of all of the famous faces, which was 
accomplished in a separate first phase where participants from the experimental and 
control groups were told the names of the famous people as their pictures were presented 
on the screen in random order. After this initial phase, the procedure was exactly the 
same as that of Experiment 1 except for one change for the refocus condition participants: 
During the fact-telling phase, refocus condition participants were required to say the 
famous person’s name aloud before telling them the fact. All subsequent instructions and 
timings were identical to Experiment 1 for both groups of participants. 
Results 
Table 4A presents the refocus recognition data and Table 4B presents the control 
recognition data expressed as proportions of hits and false alarms, accompanied by their 
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respective standard errors in parentheses below each mean. As in the prior experiments, 
the dependent variable calculated for each subject was a corrected recognition score 
(proportion hits minus proportion false alarms). Corrected recognition scores and 
standard errors for individual face memory and individual fact memory are shown in 
Figure 4.  
 Corrected recognition data were submitted to a 2 X 3 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with focus (refocus or control) as the between-subjects factor and test 
condition (face, fact, face and fact) as the within-subject factors. There were significant 
main effects of focus, F(1,40) = 8.86, MSE = .017, p < .01, and test condition, F(2,80) = 
160.14, MSE = .017, p < .001, as well as a marginally significant interaction of focus with 
test condition, F(2,80) = 2.82, MSE = .017, p = .065. 
To further explore this interaction, one-way ANOVAs were used to compare the 
effect of refocus on test conditions. Results indicated that participants in both groups 
performed similarly on individual face recognition, F(1,40) = 0.14, MSE = .018, p > .05, 
and on individual fact recognition, F(1,40) = 2.67, MSE = .009, p > .05. Importantly, 
however, the refocus group had significantly better destination memory performance 
compared to the control group, F(1,40) = 8.81, MSE = .025, p < .01. 
Pearson correlations were computed to assess the extent to which item and 
associative recognition memory performances were related. In the control condition, 
neither fact memory (r = .30) nor face memory (r = -.27) was significantly correlated 
with destination memory (both ps > .05), nor were they correlated with each other (r = -
.05, p > .05). Similarly, in the refocus condition, face memory was not correlated with 
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fact memory (r = .33, p > .05), and neither fact memory (r = -.23, p > .05) nor face 
memory (r = -.13, p > .05) was significantly correlated with destination memory. 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 4 are consistent with the explanation of why destination 
memory is relatively more error-prone than source memory. When people output 
information, the focus of attention is on oneself versus the focus being more on the 
external context when information is being received. Interestingly, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that it is possible to reduce destination memory errors by shifting the focus 
of attention—at least partly—from oneself to the person one is speaking to. This simple 
manipulation significantly improved destination memory performance. 
Methods to improve source memory are very rarely researched despite numerous 
manipulations (e.g., divided attention, Troyer, Winocur, Craik, & Moscovitch, 1999; 
increasing retention interval, Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire, 2000 ) and pseudo-
manipulations (e.g., aging, Rahhal, May, & Hasher, 2002; frontal lobe patients, 
Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989) that are reported to impair source memory. 
However, an experiment in a recent study by Davidson, McFarland, and Glisky (2006, 
Experiment 3) demonstrated that emotion can improve source memory. These researchers 
had people focus on the emotional tone of speakers who told them various negative or 
emotional messages. Using logic similar to the present Experiment 4, Davidson and 
colleagues expected that paying attention to the emotional tone of the speaker would 
draw attention to the voice-sentence pairing, leading to better integration of item and 
source information, which would then result in better source memory. Their findings 
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supported their hypothesis: Source memory benefited when the speaker’s voice was 
emotional. 
These results from Davidson et al. (2006) and from the current experiment could 
have broad implications. When people’s attention is drawn to the person with whom they 
are interacting, both source memory and destination memory improves. This 
improvement occurs because attention is directed at the person-fact pairing, which 
strengthens the association at encoding. Therefore, destination memory and source 
memory rely on similar associative processes. A factor that promotes the establishment of 
associative linkages between independent items of an episode will benefit associative 
memory performance, regardless of whether the associative memory type is destination 
memory or source memory. However, the overall performance of destination memory 
and source memory will be different because, as was the case in Experiment 2, 
destination memory is initially at a lower performance level relative to source memory. 
Consequently, to the extent that conditions which improve associative memory do so to a 
similar degree, then overall destination memory will still be worse than overall source 
memory performance. 
The view that destination memory is undermined by the self-focus that it 
generates was reinforced by Experiments 3 and 4. Increasing self-focus reduces 
destination memory whereas directing attention from oneself to the person one is telling 




As Rosenbaum (1991) wrote, “Most of the work…about the information 
processing system has been concerned with information intake rather than information 
output” (p. 101). Similarly, memory research is traditionally concerned with how people 
remember incoming or provided information. The majority of investigators research how 
people remember words that they read or hear, while others examine how people 
remember pictures or video clips that they previously saw. Thus, there has been extensive 
research on memory for source (see Johnson et al., 1993, for a review). Few researchers 
have, however, sought to understand people’s memory for their own actions. In 
particular, until now, no one has investigated how people remember what they told to 
whom, or destination memory. 
Destination memory is unique when compared to other conventional memory 
tasks. Typical laboratory testing consigns participants to the role of passive observer; they 
must remember only what the experimenter exposes them to. By contrast, everyday 
memory situations, in which destination memory is included, can be characterized by at 
least three aspects that are distinct from traditional memory research. First, as outlined by 
Zimmer and Cohen (2001), everyday memories are usually those from situations in which 
people played an active role. In most contexts, people are not passive observers. Second, 
the encoding of these memory traces is mostly unintentional or incidental. People rarely 
consciously attempt to remember situations as they are happening. Finally, everyday 
memory is a record of the bidirectional interaction between people and their environment; 
it is a result of input elements, output elements, and their interaction. Consequently, 
memory for complex events includes both source memory and destination memory. As 
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such, it is remarkable that source memory has received intense research attention whereas 
destination memory has been largely overlooked.  
Destination memory is used daily, although people likely only become aware of 
the importance of destination memory when it fails. One does not have to reflect for too 
long before being able to generate numerous examples of retelling a joke or a story to the 
same friend or colleague. Another example in which a failure of destination memory may 
cause pronounced embarrassment (among other things) is not just when one repeats 
information to the same person but when one tells new conflicting information to the 
same person. This can occur unintentionally, as when a well-meaning father inadvertently 
provides two very different (and both incorrect!) parallel parking methods to his son 
during driving lessons. But, as described at the outset of this dissertation, it can also occur 
intentionally, when an individual lies. Successful deception clearly relies on intact 
destination memory. To avoid getting caught, the person lying must remember who they 
told what to. 
It is also the case that destination memory is important for following up with tasks 
that we assign others. This is significant for a workplace supervisor who needs to 
remember to whom she delegated a particular task so that she can later discuss the 
project’s progress with the appropriate employee. Similarly, knowing what we told others 
is also important for establishing common ground (Haviland & Clark, 1974). In 
particular, we do not need to restate background information if we remember already 
having told that information to the person we are conversing with. In this way, 
destination memory facilitates our social interaction by saving time to say nothing of 
reducing boredom for those who have already heard us tell the same story.  
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Destination memory paradigm 
Of course, understanding destination memory is also informative more generally 
for theories of memory. At the very least, the scope of the domain that theories must 
encompass becomes more apparent. The paradigm that was used in this research is an 
attempt to better understand how we recollect our personal past, keeping track of the 
information that we exchange, and to arouse interest in a fundamental component of 
episodic memory: destination memory. As Johnson (2005) proclaimed, “New tasks 
sometimes provide new purchase on old problems (or revive interest, if nothing else), or 
new tasks may highlight previously unexplored aspects of problems” (p. 530). 
The destination memory paradigm was designed to provide a coherent framework, 
avoiding as many confounds as possible. By using a yes/no recognition test consistently 
throughout each experiment, performance differences that could have been caused by test 
task demands were minimized. Of particular importance, the paradigm also allowed for 
an independent assessment of whether individual items were encoded in the destination 
episode. This is critical to discern because successful retrieval of a complex memory 
event relies on intact memory for individual items within the episode. Knowledge of 
whether the encoding of a particular item (i.e., fact or face) is less than optimal is 
important to determine because poor destination memory could have been the result of 
the weak encoding of individual item information. Finally, the destination memory 
paradigm allowed for an assessment of whether the fact and face were associated with 
each other within a spatiotemporal context by using a fact and face associative 
recognition test. Comparing individual item memory and associative memory allowed for 
an assessment of what participants had difficulty retrieving.  
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Deconstructing destination memory 
Memory stores a vast wealth of information that we typically effortlessly retrieve. 
Under the proceduralist view, we are able to remember episodes by recapitulating the 
processes that were active when the event was initially encoded (Kolers & Roediger, 
1984; Roediger, 2000). Therefore, to recollect the lunch date we had last week, we access 
various memory attributes that were engaged during the previous episode. For example, 
we may remember the perceptual attributes (e.g., what our friend was wearing), spatial 
attributes (e.g., where we sat relative to the restaurant’s entrance), temporal attributes 
(e.g., the time and day of the week), as well as information regarding our thoughts and 
emotions that were experienced during our lunch date. Therefore, the success and quality 
of retrieval for our past episodes depend on information that was initially encoded 
(Johnson, 1983; Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Hirst, 1991; Johnson & Multhaup, 
1992). Consequently, the quantity and quality of the attributes belonging to the event that 
were initially recorded have ramifications for memory. It is important that the encoding 
situation facilitates both the consolidation of individual units of information of the 
episode and the integration of these units into a cohesive experience because they are not 
automatically unified or associated with one another. It seems very likely that controlled 
attentional processes are needed to associate independent units of information 
(Moscovitch, 2000). 
Because elements in an episode are not automatically related to each other, 
destination memory, like source memory, is not an all-or-none concept. In particular, it is 
not the case that destination memory retrieval is binary such that it either occurs or does 
not occur. Instead, destination memory attributions may occur at qualitatively different 
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degrees of specificity. Participants in these studies could remember the full episode (i.e., 
what they told to whom) or could remember details from the episode (i.e., remembering 
what they told but not to whom, or remembering who they told but not what they told 
them). This is analogous to what occurs outside the research laboratory. For example, at a 
very high degree of specificity, you may remember what you said to James, the location 
of the conversation, and the time at which it occurred. Alternatively, you may just 
remember what you said to James and not remember when or where you told him the 
information. At a low degree of specificity, if your destination memory fails, you may 
simply remember having told someone a particular bit of information but not recollect 
that it was to James that you told this information.  
How does the formation of an episode compare between destination memory and 
source memory? The findings from the experiments presented here suggest that for 
destination memory, in which information is outgoing, individual units of information 
within a memory episode are not as well integrated with one another as when information 
is incoming, the situation in source memory. This occurs because when participants tell 
facts to people their attention is focused on the processes required to transmit information 
(cf. Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1989). The processes involved in the transmission of facts are 
internally-based, which causes participants to focus on themselves. This self-focus 
reduces the controlled attentional processes that are available to associate the fact to the 
person that one is telling information. Therefore, destination memory is more fallible than 
source memory. 
The finding of poor destination memory performance compared to source 
memory performance (Experiment 2) is interesting when considering that past research 
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(e.g., Cohen, 1981; Engelkamp, 1990; Koriat, Ben-Zur, Druch, 1991) has demonstrated 
that outputting information typically boosts memory performance. For example, our 
laboratory has shown that saying a word aloud results in better explicit memory for the 
word than does simply reading the word silently (the production effect; MacLeod, Gopie, 
Hourihan, & Neary, submitted), a finding that corresponds nicely with the generation 
effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) and the enactment effect (Cohen, 1981; Engelkamp & 
Krumnacker, 1980). By contrast, results from these experiments indicate that outputting 
information does not benefit memory for all aspects of the learning episode, as outlined in 
the introduction. Instead, the memory benefit appears to be limited to the information that 
is said.  
Does the memory benefit for the transmitted information come at a cost for other 
information within the episode? Similar questions have been explored regarding resource 
allocation and selective attention (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Kahneman, 1973; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). For example, the generation effect—the finding that generating words in 
response to cues (e.g., what is the opposite of ‘hot’ that begins with the letter ‘c’?) results 
in considerably better memory for those words than when they are simply read (Slameka 
& Graf, 1978; see Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007, for a review and meta-
analysis)—has been subjected to an encoding trade-off account. Specifically, Jurica and 
Shimamura (1999) reported that generation improves item memory but impairs memory 
for context (i.e., for context information, there is a negative generation effect). These 
researchers proposed that because of participants’ limited resources, the task demands 
involved in generation cause participants to pay attention to the item, which benefits the 
encoding of item-specific information, but at a cost to the encoding of associations 
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between the item and other elements in the environment. Similar evidence was described 
concerning the enactment effect (Cohen, 1981; Engelkamp, 1990) in the introduction. 
Evidence that a benefit to item memory comes at a cost to associative memory is, 
however, not conclusive. First, Mulligan (2004) found that generation disrupted 
contextual memory for the colour of a target word but did not negatively affect context 
memory for location or background colour, which undermines a general item-context 
trade-off. Even more damaging for the trade-off hypothesis and conflicting with Mulligan 
is the finding that generation improves memory for both the item and contextual details 
(e.g., colour and location; Marsh, Edelman, & Bower, 2001). Although further research is 
needed to clarify the item-context trade-off hypothesis for the generation effect, these 
experiments provide various resource-allocation accounts that will be considered for 
destination memory below. 
An extreme item-context trade-off interpretation would predict that a memory 
benefit for item information would ordinarily come at a cost to other information in the 
encoding episode, whereas a more moderate view would allow that memory costs may 
occur for only particular aspects of the learning episode. Experiments 1 to 3 indicate that 
transmitting information does not undermine the encoding of the person to whom one is 
telling information. Moreover, even when destination memory suffers because of 
increased self-focus (Experiment 3), memory for the people that one speaks to still is not 
negatively affected. Therefore, the extreme item-context trade-off view is not supported 
for destination memory. 
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Instead, these results support a more moderate view that the integration of 
individual items within a destination episode is relatively impaired. When people transmit 
information, the association of independent items within a spatiotemporal context is 
disturbed because attentional resources are directed at the processes involved in 
producing the information which reduces the available resources that are needed to 
integrate independent items together. In other words, associative memory is more 
disrupted in a destination episode compared to a source episode. Consequently, people 
commit more destination memory errors than they do source memory errors. Overall, the 
memory benefit for produced information does not come at a general memory cost for 
other items in the learning episode; it is associative memory or the association of 
unrelated items within a spatiotemporal context that is impaired. 
In addition, Experiment 3 demonstrated that when people focus on themselves, 
destination memory errors increase markedly. The results of Experiment 3 are of 
particular interest when compared to the finding of Johnson et al. (1996) that focusing on 
one’s own emotions increases source misattributions. It appears that self-focus, 
irrespective of emotional content, negatively affects the establishment of connections 
among independent features from a complex memory episode. When the linkages 
between independent items of an episode are not well-established, then associative 
memory performance is compromised. However, the degree of associative memory 
impairment may be more devastating in the case of destination memory when compared 
to source memory because, as was found in Experiment 2, the fact-face pairing within the 




Of significance, it is also possible to improve destination memory based on the 
framework that has been proposed. That is, features of an episode can be better integrated 
with each other if attention is directed to their association. Experiment 4 improved fact-
person integration by highlighting the person that one was telling a fact to at the outset 
(e.g., “Oprah Winfrey, the United States postal service handles 40% of the world’s mail 
volume”). By the present account, other manipulations which emphasize the fact-person 
association should also have a positive effect on destination memory. Further, results 
from Experiment 4 have broader applications. Davidson et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
people are better able to remember who told them a fact if they paid attention to the 
emotional tone of the speaker. Together, Experiment 4 and Davidson et al.’s results 
suggest that destination memory and source memory may be improved by drawing 
attention to one’s conversational partner. Exploring the boundary conditions of this 
memory improvement will be a fruitful enterprise for theory (e.g., identifying encoding 
factors that determine the degree to which one later recollects a complex memory 
episode) and application (e.g., memory rehabilitation). 
Destination Memory and the Law 
Applied memory research over the past 30 years has clearly shown that memory 
plays an integral role in the legal domain. Much of this research has been focused on 
source memory and eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Wells & Loftus, 1984). 
Because memory is a reconstruction of past experiences instead of a retrieval of events 
recorded precisely as they occurred (e.g., Bartlett, 1932/1995; Bransford & Johnson, 
1973; Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932), determining the veracity of what is 
recollected is important. Specifically, knowing the conditions and the likelihood under 
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which witnesses are susceptible to misleading information is significant in legal cases. 
This is especially important because people often are not aware of the integrity of their 
memories. For example, it is worrisome that people are sometimes quite confident that 
their inaccurate memories are correct (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Wells, 
Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, 1998). 
In the typical eyewitness misinformation paradigm (e.g., Loftus, 1992), 
participants are exposed to an event (e.g., a movie clip of a crime) followed by a verbal 
account of the incident. Critically, half of the participants are exposed to an account that 
reflects an accurate depiction of the crime (i.e., control participants) whereas the other 
half are exposed to information that was not part of the original event (i.e., misled 
participants). Afterward, participants are questioned about the incident. Numerous studies 
confirm that misled participants are more likely than control participants to incorporate 
the misinformation as part of the original event—the misinformation effect (e.g., Belli, 
1989; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, 1992; Zaragoza & Lane, 
1994). Fortunately, using the source-monitoring framework, conditions can be specified 
that reduce suggestibility. In particular, encouraging participants to use relatively strict 
decision criteria by changing test format can eliminate the suggestibility effect (Lindsay 
& Johnson, 1989). 
Clearly, knowing the factors that influence source memory in legal proceedings is 
important. However, witnesses, plaintiffs, and defendants are usually questioned about 
what they did or what they said to whom during the relevant incident(s). The answers to 
these questions rely not on source memory but on destination memory. Therefore, 
understanding the boundary conditions and variables that influence destination memory 
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has important ramifications for testimony. This is crucial because the encoding conditions 
during crimes are less than optimal (e.g., situations are stressful, exposures are sometimes 
brief, there is sometimes a long delay between the event and being asked about it, and the 
test procedures are not generally conducive to effective retrieval strategies; Deffenbacher, 
1980). Consequently, examining how encoding factors influence destination memory is 
important and its consideration is essential in the legal realm for judges and juries to 
become aware of conditions that reduce destination memory.  
Understanding the factors that undermine the veracity of destination memory is 
important, but so too is researching the factors that may improve the reliability of 
destination memory. This is critical because encoding has already occurred by the time 
testimony or evidence is procured; therefore, retrieval is particularly significant. 
Reducing destination memory errors at retrieval may be accomplished by encouraging 
participants to use strict decision criteria as is done to reduce source memory 
suggestibility errors (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). In particular, it is hypothesized that 
destination memory errors will be reduced by encouraging participants to use recollection 
processes instead of familiarity heuristics. Promoting recollection-based processes will 
reduce destination memory errors because it will induce people to retrieve the specific 
context of the learning episode instead of them basing memory judgments on feelings of 
familiarity that are not context-specific. That is, it is not sufficient to have feelings of 
familiarity for a joke one told or a person one knows; destination memory relies on 
recollecting the specific context in which one told a particular joke to a friend. 




Also significant, but often overlooked in memory research, is knowing what one 
did not say to whom. For example, there are well known on-going civil and criminal 
lawsuits in which Peter Paul is suing former American president, Bill Clinton, and his 
wife Hillary Clinton for $41.9 million in damages. Mr. Paul alleges that Hillary Clinton 
had discussions with him regarding arrangements whereby he would support her 
campaign for the United States Senate in exchange for a pardon by then-President Clinton 
for his previous criminal convictions. As part of a declaration for the trial (Case No. BC 
304174), Hillary Clinton acknowledged meeting with the plaintiff at various events but 
was not able to “remember any of the statements” that she made to Mr. Paul.  
Interestingly, Hillary Clinton strongly believes in the integrity of her destination memory 
as evidenced by the following statement in her declaration: “I do not believe that I made 
any such statement [regarding support for my campaign in exchange for a pardon to Mr. 
Paul] because I believe I would remember such a discussion if it had occurred.” 
Consequently, it is possible for people to know—or at least to believe with conviction—
that they did not say something to a particular person. How this decision is achieved is 
unknown but it certainly is an interesting topic for future research on destination memory. 
Destination memory is special 
Researchers may be sceptical about further dividing episodic memory into source 
memory and destination memory, and within each exploring empirical observations and 
theoretical propositions. However, as Tulving (1972) wrote regarding divisions in 
memory, “Such dichotomies are among useful heuristic devices for furthering our 
understanding of mental processes. Almost all of them increment the signal-to-noise ratio 
in the literature, many of them suggest new experimental questions, and quite a few of 
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them hold the promise of becoming important entries in more permanent taxonomies of 
cognitive processes” (p. 383). At the heart of this dissertation is the belief that destination 
memory and source memory warrant independent—and joint—study. 
As illustrated previously, there are circumstances involving destination memory 
that we do not yet fully understand, such as knowing how we keep track of what we tell 
to whom or knowing how we are able to determine that we did not tell something to a 
particular person. This is part of a larger issue regarding how our memory influences the 
decisions that we make in our daily lives. A thorough investigation of destination 
memory will help address important issues and inspire new questions. Consider, for 
example, the following question: What are the processes that underlie decisions regarding 
whether people tell others a particular piece of information?  
On the surface this may appear as a simple question of knowing whether one has 
already told that information to the person; however, this is a complex issue because 
multiple factors must be taken into account. Some of these factors include knowing 
whether one has previously told the person the information, whether we believe that the 
person already knows certain aspects of the information that we are about to impart, and 
whether it is certain information that should be withheld from that particular person. 
These are fundamental factors that need to be considered for new research that explores 
destination monitoring and destination memory in general.  
In their review of the source memory research, Johnson et al. (1993) asserted that 
knowledge of source is a “critical everyday memory function” (p. 21). As source 
memory’s sibling, destination memory is equally critical, given that it serves as an 
55 
 
important component in our social interaction. The claim in this dissertation is not that 
destination memory and source memory operate independently of each other. On the 
contrary, they must interact with each other during regular conversational turn-taking, 
and their processes may rely on similar heuristics and systematic processes. However, as 
this dissertation demonstrates, compared to the association between the person and their 
information in source memory, destination memory is characterized by a weaker 
integration between information that is transferred and the person who is the destination 
of the information. Moreover, destination memory is unique in terms of the decision 
processes that are engaged during encoding. Only in destination memory are decisions 
made regarding to whom to tell information and from whom information will be 
withheld. Research is needed to examine how these decisions will affect later retrieval. 
Importantly, conceptualizing episodic memory as involving two important components—
destination memory and source memory—will bolster our understanding of how people 
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Appendix A: Facts used in Experiments 1, 2, & 4 
93% of all greeting cards are purchased by women 
A dime has 118 ridges around the edge 
A person uses 57 sheets of toilet paper each day 
An office desk has 400 times more bacteria than a toilet 
Chopsticks originated from China 4,000 years ago 
It costs 3 cents to make a $1 bill in the United States 
A disposable diaper can hold up to 7 pounds of liquid 
The life span of a dollar bill is 1 and 1/2 years 
1 billion Valentine's Day cards are sent each year in North America 
The average North American car contains 300 pounds of plastics 
There are 200 parts in a typical telephone 
18% of a person’s income is spent on transportation 
In 1962, the first Wal-Mart opened in Rogers, Arkansas 
McDonald's restaurant has over 1.5 million employees all over the world 
The United States Postal Service handles 40% of the world's mail volume 
25% of kids in the USA are overweight 
A blink lasts 0.3 seconds 
15% of the population is left-handed 
Each day 14 people die from asthma in North America 
From all the oxygen that a human breathes, 20% goes to the brain 
It takes 3 hours for food to be broken down in the human stomach 
A shrimp's heart is in its head. 
People spend 33% of their life sleeping 
The average person falls asleep in 12 minutes 
American models are skinnier than 98% of American women 
The stomach of an adult can hold 1.5 litres of material 
Women live 7 years longer than men do 
It takes 5 seconds for light to get from the sun to earth 
Roses need 6 hours of sunlight per day to grow properly 
90 people have been frozen after their death 
25% of injuries by athletes involve the wrist and hand 
38% of Americans eat breakfast everyday 
An average American eats 60 hot dogs per year 
Heinz first started making ketchup in 1876 
In a year, an American kid eats 46 slices of pizza 
80% of households have oatmeal in their kitchen 
90% of Pumpkins sold are for decoration 
The Snickers chocolate bar was invented in 1930 
A crocodile can run up to a speed of 16 kilometres per hour 
A leech has 1 brain 
A female mouse can produce up to 100 babies a year 
Rats can survive up to 14 days without any food 
Alaska has 2 times as many caribou as people 
31% of employees skip lunch entirely 
25% of Americans don't know that the sun is a star 
85% of weddings are held in a synagogue or church 
96% of candles that are purchased are purchased by women 
Women spend 55 minutes per day getting showered and dressed 
40% of the states in the U.S. have severe, or extreme pollution problems 
5% of the people who use personal ads for dating are already married 
33% of accidental deaths occur in the home 
93% of children go out trick or treating for Halloween 
8% of men are color blind 
Only 4% of babies are born on their actual due date 
50% of lottery players go back to work after winning the jackpot 
30% of the human population reside in deserts 
40% of people end up marrying their first love 
In the United States, 33% of land is covered by forests 
12 men have landed on and explored the moon 
Hitler was voted Time Magazine's man of the year in 1938 
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Appendix C: Personal fact cues used in Experiment 3 
My favourite sport is… 
My favourite animal to see at the zoo is… 
My favourite radio station is… 
If I had to choose between Coke or Pepsi I would pick… 
My favourite pet animal is… 
The class I look forward to the most is… 
My favourite junk food is… 
My favourite thing to do in Waterloo is… 
My hometown is… 
I get to campus by… 
The last time I did my laundry was… 
The weather today is… 
The length of time it usually takes me to get to campus is… 
My favourite high school teacher was… 
If I could befriend any celebrity it would be with… 
My birthday is… 
My favourite possession is… 
The street that I live on is… 
The best gift that I have received was… 
For breakfast I like eating… 
My shoe size is… 
The movie I most enjoy is… 
This weekend I will… 
The last time I read the newspaper was… 
The city I was born in was… 
My favourite thing to do on a Friday night is… 
The website I go to most often is… 
The last movie I saw was… 
The number of pets that I had as a child was… 
The last friend I saw was… 
The number of siblings I have is… 
I like my peanut butter with… 
My favourite drink is… 
My friends and I like to… 
My eye colour is… 
I love shopping at… 
The next class that I will attend is… 
The car I would love to buy is… 
My favourite dessert is 
The TV show I enjoy watching is… 
On Sunday mornings I like to… 
The program that I am studying at UW is… 
I love eating… 
My favourite colour is… 
My high school's name was… 
The season I most like is… 
I'd love to travel to… 
The fast-food place I like eating at is… 
My favourite pizza toppings are… 
My dream job is… 
My last vacation was to… 
The number of shoe pairs I own is about… 
My favourite day of the week is… 
My age is… 
My funniest friend is… 
The city I'd like to live in is… 
My best friend's name is… 
My favourite holiday is… 
The last book I read was… 




Experiment 1, Within Subject:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hits           .860         .950         .753 
         (.031)        (.017)        (.030) 
False Alarms         .090         .000         .303 
         (.030)        (.000)        (.022) 
 












Experiment 2:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition for the Source 
Instruction Group 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hit Rates          .952          .903         .787 
         (.013)        (.019)        (.025) 
False Alarms         .026         .006         .206 
         (.014)        (.004)        (.014) 
 



















Experiment 2:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition for the Destination 
Instruction Group 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hits           .818          .945         .741 
         (.034)        (.019)        (.030) 
False Alarms         .086         .018         .280 
         (.045)        (.018)        (.023) 
 






Experiment 3:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition for the Increased 
Self-Focus Group 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hits           .860          .890         .640 
         (.035)        (.023)        (.027) 
False Alarms         .080         .015         .428 
         (.024)        (.008)        (.033) 
 





Experiment 4:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition for the Refocus 
Group 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hits           .932          .979         .768 
         (.027)        (.016)        (.028) 
False Alarms         .095         .011         .242 
         (.024)        (.007)        (.026) 
 





Experiment 4:  Hits and False Alarms as a Function of Test Condition for the Refocus 
Control Group 
 
          Face         Fact   Face & Fact 
 
Hits           .900          .930         .696 
         (.022)        (.021)        (.022) 
False Alarms         .078         .009         .315 
         (.018)        (.006)        (.029) 
 




Figure 1. Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face memory, 
individual fact memory, and destination memory. 
Figure 2. Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face memory, 
individual fact memory, and associative memory for the source memory group and 
the destination memory group. 
Figure 3. Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face memory, 
individual fact memory, and destination memory for the high self-focus group and the 
low self-focus group. 
Figure 4. Corrected recognition scores and standard errors for individual face memory, 
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